1. Introduction
1.1 About n8n
n8n is a popular open-source workflow automation tool that enables users to create complex integrations between services through a node-based visual interface. It supports:
- 400+ pre-built integrations
- Custom JavaScript and Python code execution
- Self-hosted and cloud deployment options
- Multi-user collaboration features
1.2 The Security Challenge
n8n's power stems from its ability to execute arbitrary code and access system resources. This creates an inherent tension between functionality and security—the same features that make it powerful also create a massive attack surface when compromised.
2. Vulnerability Overview
2.1 Timeline of Discoveries
2.2 Vulnerability Summary Table
| CVE ID | Name | CVSS Score | Attack Vector | Authentication Required | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-68613 | Expression Injection RCE | 9.9 (Critical) | Workflow expressions | Yes (basic user) | Full system compromise |
| CVE-2025-68668 | N8scape Python Sandbox Bypass | 9.9 (Critical) | Python Code Node | Yes (basic user) | Arbitrary command execution |
| CVE-2026-21877 | Git Node Arbitrary Write | 10.0 (Critical) | Git node file operations | Yes (basic user) | Code execution via file write |
3. Technical Deep-Dive
3.1 CVE-2025-68613: JavaScript Expression Injection
Attack Mechanism
The vulnerability exploits n8n's JavaScript expression evaluation system, which allows users to embed dynamic code in workflow nodes using template syntax like {{ }}.
Core Problem: Insufficient sandboxing of JavaScript execution context allows access to dangerous Node.js internals.
Exploitation Path
Example Attack Vector (Conceptual)
An attacker with workflow edit permissions could inject expressions that:
- Use prototype pollution techniques to access
Object.constructor - Chain through JavaScript's prototype chain to reach Node.js globals
- Import dangerous modules like
child_process - Execute system commands (e.g., reverse shells, data exfiltration)
Impact Assessment
- Credential Theft: Access to all stored API keys, database credentials, OAuth tokens
- Data Exfiltration: Read sensitive workflow data, environment variables, filesystem
- Lateral Movement: Use n8n as pivot point to attack connected services
- Persistence: Modify workflows to maintain access
Affected Versions & Remediation
- Vulnerable: v0.211.0 through v1.120.3, v1.121.0, pre-v1.122.0
- Patched: v1.120.4, v1.121.1, v1.122.0+
- Fix Approach: Enhanced expression sandbox with stricter context isolation
3.2 CVE-2025-68668: Python Sandbox Bypass ("N8scape")
Attack Mechanism
n8n's Python Code Node uses Pyodide (WebAssembly-based Python runtime) with a blacklist-based security model to prevent dangerous operations.
Core Problem: Blacklist approaches are fundamentally flawed—attackers only need to find ONE unblocked path.
Exploitation Path
Why Blacklists Fail
Blacklist Approach: Block known dangerous functions (e.g., os.system, eval, __import__)
Problem: Attackers can:
- Use alternative import mechanisms
- Access functions through module aliases
- Exploit transitive dependencies
- Use reflection to discover unblocked paths
Whitelist Alternative: Only allow explicitly approved operations (more secure but limiting)
Impact Assessment
- Direct Command Execution: Run any shell command as the n8n process user
- File System Access: Read/write arbitrary files (config, secrets, databases)
- Network Pivoting: Use n8n host as attack platform
- Container Escape: Potentially break out of containerized deployments
Affected Versions & Remediation
- Vulnerable: v1.0.0 through v1.x.x (before v2.0.0)
- Patched: v2.0.0+ with task-runner isolation model
- Fix Approach: Default to isolated execution environment; require explicit opt-in for native Python
3.3 CVE-2026-21877: Git Node Arbitrary File Write
Attack Mechanism
The Git node allows users to interact with Git repositories as part of workflows. Insufficient input validation enables path traversal attacks.
Core Problem: Unconstrained file write operations in privileged execution context.
Exploitation Path
Attack Example (Conceptual)
- Create workflow with Git node
- Configure clone/pull operation with path like
../../.git/hooks/pre-commit - Inject malicious shell script into hook file
- Next git operation triggers automatic code execution
Impact Assessment
- Code Execution: Run arbitrary commands when git operations occur
- Persistence: Hooks survive across workflow runs
- Stealth: Attacks hidden in legitimate-looking git workflows
- Privilege Escalation: Execute code in context of n8n process owner
Affected Versions & Remediation
- Vulnerable: All versions before v1.121.3
- Patched: v1.121.3+
- Fix Approach: Path validation, restricted file write locations, hook directory protection
4. Root Cause Analysis
4.1 Architectural Security Challenges
4.2 The Sandbox Dilemma
Flexibility vs. Security Trade-off:
| Approach | Security Level | Functionality | Complexity |
|---|---|---|---|
| No Sandbox | Very Low | Maximum | Low |
| Blacklist | Low | High | Medium |
| Whitelist | Medium-High | Limited | Medium |
| Process Isolation | High | Medium-High | High |
| VM/Container | Very High | Medium | Very High |
n8n initially chose blacklist sandboxing for maximum flexibility—this proved catastrophically inadequate.
4.3 Common Security Anti-Patterns Identified
- Trusting Authenticated Users: Assuming authenticated = trustworthy
- Blacklist Security: Trying to enumerate all dangerous operations
- Insufficient Input Validation: Not sanitizing user-controlled paths/expressions
- Shared Execution Context: Running user code in privileged process
- Complexity Explosion: Too many features create too many attack surfaces
5. Multi-User Risk Amplification
5.1 Threat Model Comparison
5.2 Attack Scenarios in Multi-User Environments
Scenario 1: Insider Threat
- Disgruntled employee with basic workflow access
- Exploits CVE-2025-68613 to extract all API keys
- Exfiltrates customer data from connected databases
- Impact: Complete data breach
Scenario 2: Account Compromise
- Phishing attack compromises one user's account
- Attacker uses CVE-2025-68668 to establish backdoor
- Lateral movement to other connected services
- Impact: Supply chain attack vector
Scenario 3: SaaS Provider Risk
- Cloud-hosted n8n provider gets compromised
- Attacker gains access to thousands of tenant workflows
- Mass credential harvesting across organizations
- Impact: Platform-wide breach affecting all customers
6. Security Best Practices for Developers and Architects
6.1 Immediate Actions (Tactical)
Patch Management
Action Checklist:
- [ ] Audit all n8n deployments (self-hosted, cloud, development)
- [ ] Upgrade to n8n v2.0.0+ immediately
- [ ] Disable Python Code Node if not critically needed
- [ ] Disable Git node in multi-user environments
- [ ] Review all existing workflows for suspicious activity
- [ ] Rotate all credentials stored in n8n
- [ ] Check logs for unauthorized workflow executions
Network Isolation
Never expose n8n directly to the internet:
Recommended architecture:
- Place behind VPN or SSO gateway
- Use IP whitelisting
- Implement network segmentation
- Monitor all inbound connections
6.2 Architectural Recommendations (Strategic)
Design Principle 1: Principle of Least Privilege
Implementation:
- Create role-based access control (RBAC) tiers
- Restrict code execution nodes to admin roles only
- Implement workflow approval processes for sensitive operations
- Audit trail for all privilege escalations
Design Principle 2: Defense in Depth
Implementation:
- Network perimeter controls (firewalls, IDS/IPS)
- Strong authentication (SSO, MFA, certificate-based)
- Granular authorization (per-node, per-workflow)
- Containerization and resource quotas
- Comprehensive logging and alerting
Design Principle 3: Assume Breach Mentality
Key Questions:
- If an attacker gains authenticated access, what's the blast radius?
- Can you detect unauthorized workflow modifications?
- How quickly can you revoke access and rotate credentials?
- Do you have backups isolated from the n8n instance?
Mitigation Strategies:
- Separate credential stores (use external secret managers)
- Immutable workflow audit logs
- Automated credential rotation
- Incident response playbooks specific to n8n
6.3 Alternative Architectures
Option 1: Isolated Execution Model
Benefits:
- Each workflow execution in isolated container
- No persistent access to credentials
- Automatic cleanup after execution
- Limited blast radius on compromise
Trade-offs:
- Higher infrastructure complexity
- Increased latency for workflow starts
- More resource consumption
Option 2: Serverless Function Offloading
Benefits:
- Code runs in cloud provider's secure environment
- Automatic scaling and isolation
- Pay-per-execution model
- No local code execution risks
Trade-offs:
- Dependency on cloud provider
- Potential cost implications at scale
- Network latency for each call
6.4 Monitoring and Detection
Key Metrics to Monitor
Critical Alerts:
- Python/Code node executions (if disabled for users)
- Git node usage in production
- Workflow modifications outside business hours
- Sudden spike in credential access
- Failed expression evaluations (potential exploit attempts)
- New user account creations
- Role/permission changes
Detection Patterns
| Pattern | Indicator | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Mass credential export | Multiple API key retrievals in short time | Critical |
| Off-hours workflow edits | Modifications at 3 AM | High |
| Code node in production | Python/JS nodes enabled unexpectedly | High |
| Failed login spikes | Brute force attempt | Medium |
| Unusual node combinations | Git + Code nodes in single workflow | Medium |
7. Development Team Considerations
7.1 Code Review Guidelines
When building or extending n8n (or similar platforms):
Security Checklist:
- [ ] All user inputs validated and sanitized
- [ ] File paths validated against traversal attacks
- [ ] Expression evaluation uses strict sandboxing
- [ ] No direct access to Node.js/Python dangerous modules
- [ ] Credential storage uses encryption at rest
- [ ] Audit logging for all sensitive operations
- [ ] Rate limiting on workflow executions
- [ ] Resource quotas (CPU, memory, disk) enforced
7.2 AI Code Generation Risks
The document notes that small teams may use AI-assisted development, which introduces unique risks:
Concerns:
- AI models trained on vulnerable code patterns
- Lack of security-focused reasoning in generated code
- Edge cases not considered by generative models
- Copy-paste security flaws from training data
Mitigations:
- Always human review for security implications
- Use static analysis security testing (SAST) tools
- Implement comprehensive integration testing
- Security training for developers on common pitfalls
7.3 Dependency Management
n8n's complexity comes partly from its extensive dependency tree:
Best Practices:
- Regular dependency audits (npm audit, Snyk, etc.)
- Automated vulnerability scanning in CI/CD
- Pin dependency versions (avoid wildcards)
- Review transitive dependencies for hidden risks
- Subscribe to security advisories for key dependencies
8. Organizational Decision Framework
8.1 Risk Assessment Matrix
8.2 Decision Criteria
When n8n May Be Appropriate:
- Single-user personal automation
- Internal network only, no internet exposure
- Non-sensitive data processing
- Development/testing environments
- Strong security team oversight
When to Consider Alternatives:
- Processing regulated data (HIPAA, PCI-DSS, etc.)
- Multi-tenant SaaS requirements
- High-value target for attackers
- Limited security resources
- Compliance requirements prohibit self-hosted arbitrary code
8.3 Alternative Solutions
| Tool | Security Model | Use Case | Trade-offs |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zapier | Fully managed SaaS | Simple integrations | Limited customization, cost |
| Make (Integromat) | Managed with advanced features | Complex workflows | Learning curve |
| Temporal.io | Workflow orchestration | Microservices coordination | Developer-focused |
| Apache Airflow | Data pipeline orchestration | Data engineering | Requires infrastructure |
| AWS Step Functions | Cloud-native serverless | AWS-centric workflows | Vendor lock-in |
9. Incident Response Playbook
9.1 Detection Phase
9.2 Containment Actions
Immediate (0-15 minutes):
- Disable network access to n8n instance
- Snapshot current state for forensics
- Disable all user accounts except admin
- Stop all running workflows
Short-term (15-60 minutes):
- Review audit logs for compromise indicators
- Identify all potentially affected workflows
- List all credentials stored in system
- Check connected services for lateral movement
Medium-term (1-4 hours):
- Rotate all credentials stored in n8n
- Notify affected service providers
- Review backup integrity
- Prepare fresh instance from clean image
9.3 Recovery and Lessons Learned
Recovery Steps:
- Deploy patched n8n version in isolated environment
- Import workflows from backup (after security review)
- Implement enhanced monitoring before re-enabling
- Phased rollout with strict access controls
- User re-authentication and security awareness
Post-Incident Review:
- Document attack timeline
- Identify security control gaps
- Update detection rules
- Improve security posture
- Share learnings with team
10. Future-Proofing Security
10.1 Emerging Threats
AI-Powered Attacks:
- Automated vulnerability discovery in workflows
- AI-generated exploit chains
- Social engineering via AI-crafted workflows
Supply Chain Risks:
- Compromised node packages in community extensions
- Malicious workflow templates
- Backdoored integrations
10.2 Recommended Security Roadmap
Phase 1: Immediate (0-30 days)
- Emergency patching and hardening
- Risk assessment and network controls
- Critical workflow review
Phase 2: Short-term (1-3 months)
- Implement comprehensive access controls
- Deploy monitoring and alerting
- Migrate to secure credential management
Phase 3: Long-term (3-12 months)
- Architectural redesign for isolation
- Security culture development
- Compliance and audit readiness
11. Conclusion
11.1 Key Takeaways
Arbitrary Code Platforms Are Inherently Risky: n8n's vulnerabilities are not unique—any platform allowing user-controlled code execution faces similar challenges.
Authenticated Threats Are Real: Don't assume authenticated users are trustworthy. Insider threats and account compromises are significant attack vectors.
Sandboxing Is Extremely Hard: Blacklist approaches fail. Effective isolation requires process separation, containerization, or serverless architectures.
Defense in Depth Is Essential: No single control is sufficient. Layer multiple security measures to reduce blast radius.
Continuous Vigilance Required: Security is not a one-time fix. Regular audits, patching, and monitoring are mandatory.
11.2 Strategic Recommendations
For Individual Developers:
- Use n8n for personal projects only
- Never expose instances to the internet
- Keep updated with latest patches
- Minimize use of code execution nodes
For Small Teams:
- Carefully evaluate if automation benefits outweigh risks
- Consider managed alternatives (Zapier, Make) for sensitive use cases
- Implement strict network isolation
- Regular security reviews
For Enterprise Architects:
- Conduct thorough threat modeling before deployment
- Design for compromise (assume breach mentality)
- Implement comprehensive monitoring
- Maintain incident response capabilities
- Consider alternatives for regulated workloads
11.3 Final Perspective
The n8n vulnerabilities demonstrate a fundamental truth: convenience and security often conflict in automation platforms. The same features that make n8n powerful—flexible code execution, extensive integrations, rapid workflow development—create a massive attack surface when security controls fail.
Organizations must make informed decisions about where this trade-off is acceptable. For personal automation in non-sensitive contexts, n8n (properly secured) can be valuable. For multi-user environments handling critical data, the risk may outweigh the benefits.
The bottom line: Treat self-hosted arbitrary code execution platforms with the same security rigor as production databases or authentication systems. They deserve nothing less.
12. Additional Resources
12.1 Official Sources
- n8n Security Advisories: https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories
- n8n Documentation: https://docs.n8n.io/
- n8n Community Forum: https://community.n8n.io/
12.2 News Articles
- The Hacker News: https://thehackernews.com/2025/12/critical-n8n-flaw-cvss-99-enables.html
- The Hacker News: https://thehackernews.com/2026/01/new-n8n-vulnerability-99-cvss-lets.html
- The Hacker News: https://thehackernews.com/2026/01/critical-n8n-vulnerability-cvss-100.html
- Penligent: https://www.penligent.ai/hackinglabs/cve-2025-68668-deep-dive-the-n8n-pyodide-sandbox-escape-ai-infrastructure-risk/
12.3 Security References
- CVE Database: https://cve.mitre.org/
- OWASP Top 10: https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
- CWE Sandbox Evasion: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/693.html
12.4 Monitoring and Tools
- Shodan: For identifying exposed instances
- Rapid7: Vulnerability intelligence
- Material Security: Workspace protection (mentioned in source)
12.5 Security Awareness
- Video Source:
- BleepingComputer: Security news and advisories
- The Hacker News: Vulnerability disclosures
Appendix A: Glossary
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| RCE | Remote Code Execution—ability to run arbitrary code on a target system |
| Sandbox | Isolated execution environment to limit code capabilities |
| CVE | Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures—standardized vulnerability identifier |
| CVSS | Common Vulnerability Scoring System—standardized severity rating |
| Blacklist | Security approach blocking known dangerous operations |
| Whitelist | Security approach allowing only explicitly approved operations |
| Pyodide | WebAssembly-based Python runtime for browsers |
| Path Traversal | Attack technique accessing files outside intended directory |
| Git Hooks | Scripts automatically executed during git operations |
| RBAC | Role-Based Access Control—permission system based on user roles |
This whitepaper is provided for educational and security awareness purposes. Always refer to official n8n documentation and security advisories for the most current information.


















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